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Ethnographic accounts of religious practice offer rich and compelling access to
the details of lived religion in local sites. Insights from the phenomenological tradition
have become increasingly influential in thinking about what etlulOgraphies accomplish.
Although etlmographies of religion do well to pay attention to phenomenological
concems, ethnographic research and analysis cannot do the same work as
phenomenological analysis in studying religion. Etlmographies of religion pay attention
to diverse narratives and ways of storytelling, which are important aspects of members'
lived religious practice but are unavailable in phenomenological analysis. Storytelling is a
fragile research practice that involves inherent ambiguities for ethnographers. These
ambiguities call for a persistent and critical reflexivity to be inscribed in ethnographic
writing. This reflexivity implies a fundamentally ethical way of thinking about
ethnographic research and writing, one that pays attention to the care that is required for
good ethnographies of religious practice.
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The phenomenological tradition has strongly influenced theoretical considerations
of sociological research and writing. Alongside this, there has been an increasing
attention to methodological problems across methods and sub-disciplines of sociology.
Generalized crises of representation emerging from so-called 'postmodern' literatures-
primarily from the slightly more specific fields of critical theory, poststructuralism and
post-Heideggerian phenomenology-seeped into the discourse of social scientists in the
form of increasing hand-wringing about the nature of social-scientific research and
analysis. Specifically, those more 'subjective' methods of social-scientific work, often
gathered wIder the heading 'qualitative', were sharply rebuked for their negligence in
addressing the vicissitudinous and indeterminate character of their various research
programs.
Certainly more ink has been spilled on this problem in the last half-century than I
could hope to address. More to the point, much of the work that addresses this problem
does so in a generalized way, and works on various assumptions about what the work of
social-scientific research and analysis is meant to accomplish. There is no doubt that
much ofthi5 criticism has been necessary, especially with regard to pointing out the
endemic problem of inscribing colonialism, racism, anthropocentrism, misogyny,
patriarchy, and other forms of bigotry mId bias into social-scientific literature. And there
2is no doubt that one of the lessons of these criticisms is that this is very much an endemic
problem, and one that will not go away.]
Ethnographic research is one area of social science that has been heavily subject
to these criticisms. But it has also long been an important and vital way of practicing the
sociological analysis of religion. Etlmographic accounts of religious practice offer rich
and compelling access to the details of' lived religion' in local sites.2 Serious questions
have been raised about the work of ethnography. To what extent are ethnographic
accounts framed by various decisions that the ethnographer makes in establishing and
carrying out her research? Whose etlmographic accolUlt is being presented in narratives
that proceed from etlmographic research? What is the relationship between the
discoveries of ethnographic research and quantitative analysis? Is it possible to theorize
based on ethnographies of religion, or must ethnography be content with offering
tenuous, localized descriptions of religious practices that provide no resources for
understanding pattems or typologies of religion in society? What do ethnographies of
religion accomplish?
In an essay written after the publication of her seminal ethnography Jvfarna Lola,
Karen McCarthy Brown says that
the analogy commonly drawn between anthropology and the natural
sciences has ceased to be helpful to me. While I still care about
factuality and freedom from bias, those standards are no longer the
1 This aspect of these criticisms will be addressed in Chapter IV below.
2 This is the tel111 taken up by Meredith B. McGuire in her book Lived Religion: Faith and Practice in
Everyday Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). McGuire's work will figure significantly in this
essay.
- - ---- -------
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most demanding ones for my work. Over the years I have come to
understand antlu'opological fIeldwork as something closer to a social
art form than a social science.3
The force of the criticisms of 'qualitative' social-scientific research discussed above seem
to tend toward a position such as Brown's. (Or those criticisms might lead social
scientists to attempt to systematize and fon11alize ethnographic research and analysis in
ways that approach various methodologies in quantitative social-scientific work.4) Since
the models of the natural sciences have long been the paragons of objectivity and truth in
Western thinking, such an admission by Brown might appear to relegate the kind of
research that she does to a lower order of social-scientific work.
Of course, Brown does not think this to be the case, and much of what comes
below is intended to dispel such a framework for thinking about etlmographies of
religion. Part of what I will argue is precisely that ethnographic research does fail to
accomplish the specific kind of rigor and objectivity that is delineated by f0I111S of social-
science research that are modeled on the natural sciences. Furthermore, it necessarily fails
to accomplish this because the objects of etlmographic research are precisely not
available for study via scientifIC methodologies. That is, the phenomena that are taken up
for analysis by etlmographies of religion are precisely not phenomena for quantitative-
scientific methodologies.
3 129-130 in Karen McCarthy Brown, 'Writing about "the Other", Revisited', in Personal Knovvledge and
Beyond: Reshaping the Ethnography o.fReligion, eds. James V. Spickard, J. Shawn Landres lUld Meredith
McGuire (New York: New York University Press, 2002),127-133. Also, see Mama Lola: A Vodou
Priestess in BrookZvn (Berkeley: University of Ca1ifomia Press, 1991).
4 For one of the more interesting attempts at this kind of direction, see Robelt Aunger, 'On Ethnography:
Storytelling or Science?', in Current Anthropology 36 (1995): 97-130.
4Rather, etlmographic research and analysis is properly located at the intersection
between various kinds of storytelling and phenomenology. The etlmographer's job is to
tell critical stories about other people's stories, and phenomenology is a rich resource for
how these stories can be told. While the roots of phenomenology aspired to the rigor of
the natural sciences, much theory and research appropriating phenomenology to
sociology provides fruitful insights for ethnographers that is amenable to the fundamental
nalTative quality of etlmographies of religion. 5 But this intersection should not be
construed as a way to save ethnographic research for the truth and objectivity of the
natural sciences. Ethnographic research and writing is a profolUldly ethical exercise that
requires the persistent inscription of kinds of ret1exive analysis in order to sustain itself as
an activity associated with truth. Brown, for example, is very interested in truth, not as
the objectivity of the sciences but as 'truth telling and justice' , which are certainly more
fragile and unstable ways of thinldng about truth but are nevertheless the proper work of
ethnographies of religion.
Chapter II attempts a cursory genealogy of the question ofthe object of social
science, incorporating insights from Durkheim and some of his later interpreters,
especially those coming out ofthe phenomenological tradition in sociology. I then
miiculate three schemas for situating social research. Through the work of Meredith
McGuire and Robert Orsi I attempt to situate etlmographic research within these
schemas. Finally, I return to some of the phenomenological themes in Durkheim's
interpreters and show the ways in which ethnography can and cannot make use of




phenomenological insights. I eventually identify the proper work of etlmography as a
kind of critical or reflexive storytelling, within which much use can be made of
phenomenological analysis.
In Chapter III I develop the concept of narrative or storytelling as I think it applies
to ethnographic research and writing. Begilming with Michael Jackson's The Politics of
Storytelling, as well as research by Mark Freeman, Judith Butler, and Paul Ricoeur, I try
to give an extended definition of what storytelling is, and why and how we do it. After
tentatively transposing this question into the context of ethnographies of religion, I argue
that there is an essentially heterogeneous character to both the work and the
accomplishment of ethnographies of religion such that the success or failure of the
truthfulness of a given etlmography must be specific to how it tells critical stories about
other people's stories. Central to the success or failure of this accomplislmlent is the
awareness of the ethnographer regarding the nature and scope of her etlmographic
activities.
Finally, in Chapter IV I argue that this awareness is an ethical compOltment with
regard to the ethnographer's research and writing. Returning to insights from Judith
Butler, and incorporating Stephen K. White's conceptual framework surrounding 'weak
ontology', I suggest that successful ethnographic research and writing-that is, truth-
telling ethnographies-require a persistent and critical reflexivity to be inscribed into the
research and the writing. This allows for an opening onto what Paul Ricoeur calls an
'ethics of discourse', where the ethnographer can give a rigorous and rich account of
religious sites while entrusting the reader and the subject with a recognition of the
fragility and instability ofthe account. Moreover, the persistent recognition of this
fragility and instability emiches the availability of the phenomena themselves and thus
allows writers of ethnographies to give richer accounts of religious sites.
6
7CHAPTER II
ETHNOGRAPHY AND SCHKMAS OF SOCIAL RESEARCH
What do we study when we study society? Durkheim says that sociology is the study of
social facts. Durkheim provides a very careful definition of social facts at the beginning
of The Rules ofSociological Method: Social facts 'consist of maIUlerS of acting, thinking
and feeling extemal to the individual, which are invested with a coercive power by virtue
of which they exercise control over him,.6 In the Preface to the Second Edition,
Durkheim says that the 'basic principle' of sociology is 'the objective reality of social
facts'.? Harold Garfinkel interprets Durldleim as saying that 'the objective reality of
soci,u f~lcts is sociology's fundamentalphenomenon,.8 Garfinkel has a complicated story
to tell about what this means-specifically, what it means for etlmomethodological
research-but he is very clear about what Durkheim's aphorism proposes: that there is a
lived orderliness to 'immortal, ordinary society' available to the researcher, and that this
is the object of sociological study. The word 'immortal' is peculiar here, and Garfinkel
explains: 'Immortal is a metaphor for the great recunencies of ordinary society, staffed,
provided for, produced, observed, and observable, locally and naturally accountable in
6 Emile Dmkheim, The Rules o/Sociological Method, trans. W.D. Halls (New York:: The Free Press, 1982),
52.
7 Durkheim, The Rules (iSociological Method, 45.
8 Harold GarfInkel, EthnOinethodology 's Program: Working Out Durkheim 's Aphorisnl, ed. Anne WarfIeld
Rawls (Lanham: Rowman and LittlefIeld, 2002), 66.
8and as of an "assemblage of haecceities".' 9 Examples that Gartlnleel uses are: trafllc
jams, hallway greetings, formatting queues, etc. But really, these everyday occurrences of
'immortal, ordinary society' are just all those activities that go into making up any social
scene.
Durldleim's social facts are objective because they are not reducible to the actions
or representations of the individual. While any social scene is necessarily staffed by
individuals, the production of that social scene is 'the organizational thing as of their
doing... but not of their very own, singular, distinctive authorship,.10 That is, the
production of social scenes is 'congregational', is produced as an ensemble of members,
and it is produced 'unwittingly,.11 So Durldleim's objectivity is always and only found in
specific sites of social phenomena. Objectivity here does not mean generality. Instead it
refers to the paradox of society that Berger and Ludemann identify as the basic problem
of sociological theory: 'How is it possible that subjective meanings become objective
.c: ••• ?,12lactIcltIes.
Berger and Ludemann identify the 'marching orders' of sociology-as issuing
from Durldleim and Weber-as a sustained and simultaneous attention to the 'objective
9 Garfinkel, Ethnomethodology's Program, 92. GarfInkel borrows the metaphor from Durkheim. See Emile
Durkheim, The Elementmy Forms ofReligious Life, trans. Karen E. Fields (New York: The Free Press,
1995),271-272.
10 Garfinkel, Ethnomethodology's Program, 92.
11 See Eric Livingston's description of this in Alaking Sense ofEthnomethodology (London: Routledge,
1987), 10-11.
12 Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmaml, The Social Construction ofReality (New York: Anchor Books,
1966),18.
9facticity and subjective meaning' that is the 'dual character of society,.13 This is one way
that theorists have schematized social phenomena. We will see that ethnographers of
religion like Robert Orsi and Meredith McGuire have made significant use of this
schematization in their work, and that phenomenological analyses play an important role
in this approach. Berger and LuclG11CUU1'S descriptions in The Social Construction of
Reality cu'e in many ways a distillation of insights derived as much 11'om Schutz and
Scheler as from Durkheim and Weber. The central phenomenological problem in
sociological analysis is to uncover generalized structures of existence within particular
social scenes.
Berger and Luckmann accomplish this by focusing on the oscillating and
reciprocal activities of institutionalization and socialization. The fomler activity' occurs
whenever there is a reciprocal typification of habitualized actions by types of actors' .14
And socialization occurs whenever institutionalized social practices are 'intemalized' by
a social actor. 15 So, for excunple, there are certain accepted ways of greeting someone
while passing them on the street that are intricately specified according to the kind of
relationship the first greeter has with the second. When I pass my advisor, I know a
certain way (or a number of appropriate ways) of greeting her that would be inappropriate
in the case of greeting a student, or again, a close friend. And likewise, my advisor knows
13 Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction ofReality. 18. Properly, there are three moments that
Berger and Luck111ann describe within this process: extel11alization, objectivation and intel11alization.
14 Ibid., 54.
15 Berger and Luclunann make an important distinction between primary socialization~moreor less
leal11mg how to be social~andsecondary socialization~wherean already socialized being takes up
institutional 'sub-worlds' within the social milieu. For our purposes, the latter is of most interest. See The
Social Construction ofReality, 129ff.
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how she ought to greet me. Not only this, but the various ways of greeting that each of us
might take up are massively detennined by other variables in the social scene. How long
has it been since we last met? Have I been remiss in sending her some work that she is
expecting from me? Was our last meeting contentious? Are we meeting in an
unsurprising place, such as a hallway or elevator in the building that our offices are in, or
are we meeting in a faraway city that neither of us knew the other would be in? What is
remarkable about all of this is how well we know how to take account of all these things
in effecting a successful greeting. We are experts at it. But of course, this expertise is
localized. The specific sets of knowledge that go into this expertise vary from culture to
culture, society to society, time to time. IfI move to a country that requires significantly
different knowledge sets in order to effect successful greetings, I will first have to leam
how to greet all over again. Eventually, given enough practice and training (that is, given
enough failed or awkward attempts at greeting, and given enough reinforcement by other
social actors in the scene that I have not yet gotten it right), I will become an expert at
greeting in these new greeting-institutions. And this means: I will do it effortlessly, not
because it is now 'easy' for me but because it now is me.
The way that Berger and Luckmanll schematize the objects of social research is
fundamentally phenomenological, given the cursory definition of phenomenology that I
gave above. So according to this model the sociologist must study both the social fact
things of Durkheim and GarfInkel, and the subjective aspects of the sociological world
that Weber and Schutz are interested in. And as Berger and Luckmanll point out, this
does not put these two polarities at odds with each other, since they are aspects of a single
11
milieu. But they are in tension, insofar as the processes of subjectivation and
institutionalization are necessarily inscribed within a dialectical process that makes up the
scenes of sociological analysis. Nevertheless, one ofthe problems we will have to
examine below is to what extent both of these aspects can be adequately addressed by
any given particular method of social research.
Berger and Luckmann's schematization is an important one for thinking about
both the methods and objects of social research, but it is not the only one. Another way to
think about society can be divided along the lines of what Spickard and Landres have
called, in the context of the social-scientific study of religion, 'generalizers' and
'particularizers' .16 The generalizers are those-and we might think of Rodney Stark here,
for example-who try to chart 'trends of religious life' and, presumably, interpret these
trends through certain theoretical frameworks. 17 The particularizers 'show us the minute
details of specific religions', giving us localized, attentive descriptions of particular social
religious scenes. I8 Of course, this delineation is also found in the standard language of
'quantitative' vs. 'qualitative' research, but this is a messy distinction, given that these
tenns do not really give us any details about a pa1iiculm' research program. 19 A
quantitative approach could very well, in its specificity, give us a more localized and
16 James V. Spickard and 1. Shawn Landres, 'Whither Etlmography? Transforming the Social-Scientific
Study of Religion' , in Personal Kno-wleclge and Beyond, 1-14.
17 Spickard and Landres, 'Wllither Ethnography?', 1. The reference to Stark is my OWIl.
18 Ibid., 1.
19 Another polarity that loosely maps onto this is the distinction that Garfinkel makes between FOlTIml
Analytic and Ethnomethodological studies (allowing for Ethnomethodology as a broad category, if
rigorous). See e.g., 121-134 in Ethnomethoclology's Program.
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detailed analysis than a qualitative approach whose scope is overly broad.2o The
generalizer/particularizer schema is somewhat more helpful, though in any case we
would need a more specific description of the methods to know what we are dealing with.
What seems very clear about the generalizer/particularizer schema is that there is
much less hope for a rapprochement between its polarities. Simply, the more
'particularized' any given research program becomes, the less it will be able to speak to
general patterns or trends in religion as a whole. Inversely, increasing generalization in
research programs means a decreasing ability to account for details of distinctions in data.
A third way of schematizing social research has recently been articulated in an
exceptionally clear and straightforward way by Howard Becker. Becker says, plainly that
any kind of social-scientifIc research and reporting involves making and communicating
representations about society.21 Furthermore, 'every version of social science analysis has
to do the job of making less out of more, in the process making what has been gathered
more intelligible and assimilable,.22 Social science is in the business of' summarizing
details', and constructing representations that say something about those details.
'Knowledge results from weeding out extraneous detail and exposing basic structures, the
20 For an account of the diffuse nature of these categories in CUlTent research, see Ronald L. Jackson II,
Darlene K. Dmmmond and Sakile Camara, 'What is Qualitative Research?', in Qualitative Research
Reports in Communication 8 (2007): 21-28.
21 Howard S. Becker, Telling About Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). This is the third
in a remarkable series of texts about the work of writing social science. The fIrst two texts are Tricks (?lthe
Trade (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), and rVriting fiJI' Social Scientists (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 2007).
22 Becker, Telling About Society, 59.
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part we're interested in. Not everything is interesting or useful to us. ,23 This distillation of
details into representations also addresses another aspect of Becker's schema of social
research. Becker says that the summarizing of details and construction of representations
will proceed differently according to what the researcher is interested in studying, and
that every way of doing research is adequate to some goal of some researcher. 'Every way
of doing things is perfect-jar something. ,24 Becker points out that arguments about
which research methods are the 'right' ones are largely misguided. Different research
methods accomplish different things, and moreover they are designed to accomplish
ditTerent things.
Becker's schema is related to the schema proposed by Spickard and Landres, and
provides insight into what is going on with the generalizer/particularizer polarity. On
Becker's reading, these approaches ought not to be pitted one against the other in a battle
to detennine which one is more authoritative or provides one with the real truth about
religion. Instead, each pole in the schema is designed to make available to the
researcher-and then the reader-certain aspects of religion and religious practice that
the researcher and reader are interested in.25 This will be an important consideration as
we try to situate ethnography within this schema.
So far, we have briefly considered three schemas of social research that identify
and highlight certain aspects of the structure and study of society. It may seem odd to
23 Ibid., 93.
24 Ibid., 72.
25 Becker calls the researcher and reader, respectively, the maker and user (of representations about
society). Cf. Telling About Society, 26ff.
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group these schemas together, since the first schema seems mostly to be making claims
about the structure of society, while the latter schemas address the study of society. But it
is perhaps already clear that these schemas are closely related, especially given what
Becker says. How they are related is part of the concern of this essay, with om primary
aim to articulate how the ethnography of religion fits into these schemas, and how the
relations between them show up in ethnographic research and writing.26
More generally, we could say that all of these schemas are different ways of
thinking about the relationship between the wliversal and the particular. The
anthropologist Michael Jackson has written that this is perhaps the central schematic
problem for thinking about the work of etlmography.27 While the tendency of much
social-scientific work is to think about this relationship by distilling it through fomlalized
methods, 'logic, theory, and academic argot', Jackson finds in etlmography a way of
addressing the question of the lmiversal and the particular.28 We will retmn to Jackson's
work in Chapter III.
So how is etlulography situated within these three particular-universal schemas? It
may be tempting at first to say that in each case, etlmography is on the side of the
particular. Ethnographers' jobs are to give us detailed descriptions and analyses of
26 In relating ethnography of religion to these schemas of social research-and tracing these schemas
through the histOly of sociology-I am not going to pay attention to distinctions between anthropology and
sociology when discussing ethnography. There may be important methodological or theoretical distinctions
between the two in some cases-though I am suspicious of claims along these lines-but part of the work
of this essay is to show precisely that the etlmographer does not have the prerogative to make such
distinctions hard and fast. Moreover, much of ethnographic theOly in anthropology speaks directly to
methodological and theoretical issues in sociology, and vice versa-this is also made obvious in this essay.
27 Michael Jackson, Minima Ethnographica (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 2ff.
28 Jackson, Minima Ethnographica, 33.
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localized practices, ot~ in our case, members' lived religion. These intimate, personal
practices ought to be situated on the side of the subjective in the Berger and Luckmann
schema, since ethnographies of religion largely try to show tlus aspect of religious life.
Similarly, and this is what Spickard and Landres tlunk, ethnography should be
situated primarily within the pole of the particularizers according to their schema, since
what ethnographers do is 'choose a specific research locale, which they spend several
years getting to know'.29 Although Spickard and Landres are out to complicate the
traditional narrative of ethnographic authority (we have 'been there', so we know what it
is really about), they do not seem worried about the straightforward identification of
research methods with their schematic polarity.3o
The question of how to situate ethnography within Becker's schema is more
difficult, since Becker's schema is fonnal, while the first two schemas are derivative of
certain aspects of social research. In order for us to assess ethnography via Becker's
schema, we need to know what ethnographies are trying to tell us about society. And this
leads us back to the question of having to situate etlmography within the schemas of
Berger and Luckmann and Spickard and Landres. Are ethnographers of religion trying to
tell us something about how religion works generalzv? Are they trying to make available
to their readers objective structures of religious practice, along the lines of the
phenomenological tradition in sociology? Or are they just trying to get a handle on how
this group right here in this time embodies these specific religious practices? Are
29 Spickard and Landres, 'Whither Ethnography?', 2.
30 Fmthennore, the tone of many of the essays in Personal Knowledge and Beyond betrays the retention of
a superior-though maligned-role of ethnography in social-scientific research. See, e.g., Karen McCmthy
Brown's conmlents in 'Writing about the "Other," Revisited', 127-133.
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ethnographers just describers? Or does etlmography do more than describe, and if so,
what is that more?
Prominent etlmographers of religion have begun to readdress these questions. 3! In
briefly considering recent arguments made by Meredith McGuire and Robeli Orsi we will
develop a specifIc conception ofthe ethnography of religion that critically situates it
within the schemas of Berger and Luckmann and Spickard and Landres, and answers the
questions that Becker needs answering before any further assessment can be done. In so
doing, we will begin to develop a picture of what ethnography does and does not, can and
caImot, accomplish. This will lead us to consider in Chapter III how ethnographers of
religion accomplish good ethnography.
Meredith McGuire, in her book Lived Religion: Faith and Practice in Everyday
L~fe, describes a strong tension in the sociology of religion between systematic macro-
sociological narratives ofreligion and the ways in which those narratives' actual
members live out and practice the religions to which they adhere. 32 So, for eXaIllple, the
persuasiveness of rational choice theory has led many to champion it as a great
explanatory model for the ways in which people choose and engage in religious
practices. Rodney Stark's work is exemplary in this regard, arguing for the localized
reasonableness of peoples' religious practices and peculiar effIcacy of certain types of
religious pattems throughout recorded hlU11an history. The simplicity, clarity and
neatness of these kinds of studies translate well from easily and often quoted surveys of
31 The essays in Personal Knowledge and Beyond provide a detailed picture of the ways in which
ethnographers of religion have been rethinking their work.
32 McGuire's polarity here is clearly close to that of Spickard and Landres.
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the so-called 'state of religion', which make their way into popular media in the form of
de-contextualized statistics manipulated in order to convince the listener or reader ofthe
death or revival of religion.
Against the prevalence ofthese kinds of studies and this way of framing research
projects in the sociology of religion, McGuire laments that something important-indeed
central-is lost in a dominant reliance on this way of doing social-scientific research. In
her research, and in the research of others, she has discovered that the 'standard scholarly
concepts of religion and religiosity' are largely lacking in the capacity to actually
describe the particular lived religions of almost anyone. 33 Instead, these research projects
tend to tell stories about religion that are exceedingly faithful to the official, proprietary
version of that religion as told by the institutional and hierarchical leaders in that religion.
This way of approaching the study of religion therefore assumes that an adherent of a
religion, identified as such in a surveyor interview, maps on ullproblematically-or at
least mostly unproblematically-to the institutional/hierarchical version of that religion.
McGuire argues that this is simply not how things work with respect to the practiced
religious lives of the individuals that make up the memberships of these institutions.
' ...Each individual's biographical narrative [is not] simply a microcosm of the grand
narrative of some "official" religion. ,34 Robeli Orsi makes this same point when he
writes: 'There is no such thing as a "Methodist" ... who can be neatly sUlmnarized by an
33 McGuire, Lived Religion, 4. And this just to the extent that they describe 'everyone'.
34 Ibid., 12.
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account of the denomination's history or theology ...What exists are histories of people
working on their worlds in specific way at specific times and places. ,35
McGuire and Orsi are right. Treatments of religion in sociology that attempt to
track and analyze trends across large populations are necessarily in the business of
generalizing and typifying results and telling a story that accurately represents the data.
Furthermore, this is just what sociologists like Stark are after. They are not interested in
ethnographic data, nor in specified, local practices, if they Calmot be typified to reveal
general structures of religion and religious experience. Of course, for any set of
ethnographic data, Stark could presumably tell a story of its subjects such that they
appeal' to be behaving according to some Variallt of rational choice theory. But his
interest is in the structures of religious behavior that Call be generalizedfj'om these local
accounts. 36 In typifying across such a mass of data and diversity of practice, distOliion
will occur. That is, theorizing social phenomena on the level of the articulation of
generalized rules and laws is not the same work as ethnography. We will see that
ethnography can reveal inmlanent structures that are made available in the ethnographic
data, and these can be related to or described in terms of theoretical constructs. Indeed,
according to Becker this is exactly the work of social-scientific research and wTiting of
35 Robeli A. Orsi, BeMeen Heaven and Earth: The Religious Worlds People Make and the Scholars Who
Study Them (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 168-169.
36 See, e.g., Rodney Stark, 'Micro FOlUldations of Religion: A Revised Theory', in Sociological Theory 17
(1999): 264-289; and Rodney Stark and Roger Finke, Acts ofFaith: Explaining the Human Side ofReligion
(Berkeley: University of Califomia Press, 200). For a thoroughgoing critique of Stark and Finke from
another angle, see Colin Jer01l1lack and Douglas Porpora, 'Religion, Rationality, and Experience: A
Response to the New Rational Choice Theory of Religion', in Sociological Theory 22 (2004): 140-160.
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any stripe. But there is not a deductive relationship between ethnographic data and macro
theories along the lines of Stark, and there cannot be.
McGuire is concerned with what is lost in much of theoretical accounts of religion
that rely significantly or exclusively on what are necessarily limited surveys and
questionnaires. These methods for retrieving data, she contends, cover up or miss
important aspects of the everyday lives of individuals' religious practices. McGuire
thinks that the lived religious practices of the members that staff any category or type of
religious institution reveals a ftmdamentally different picture of religion. Ethnographic
research into lived religion shows us that 'the Western image of a religion as a w1itary,
organizationally defined, and relatively stable set of collective beliefs and practices' is a
false image.3? Instead, religious practices are essentially syncretic and malleable.
McGuire's argument is that the site of syncretism and malleability ofreligious practices
is always the individual, and so this ought to be the focus of research-thus the
importance of ethnography.
McGuire frames this role of the individual with Levi-Strauss' concept of
'bricolage', developed in his 1962 book The Savage l\!find. Levi-Strauss used this tenll as
a way of describing the spontaneous and creative activities of a social thinker/actor
within a closed structuralist system.38 McGuire describes bricolage (as she is using it) as
37 McGuire, Lived Religion, 186.
38 Claude Levi-Strauss, The Savage Alind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1966). See especially 16-
33. The metaphor ofbricolage is taken up in other structuralist and post-structuralist literature, notably by
Jacques Derrida in 'Structme, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences', in Writing and
Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978),278-293; and Gilles Deleuze
and Felix Guattari, Anti-OedipUS, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane (Mull1eapolis:
University of Millllesota Press, 1978).
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'the practice of eclectically choosing the elements of... religious belief and practice,
loosely mortaring them together'. 39 McGuire fomls both her critique of macro pictures of
religion and he own positive account around the phenomena of religious practice that
bricolage is meant to illuminate:
[It] remains an empirical question whether the eclecticism of much
contemporary religion-as-lived is, indeed, so very different from
people's practices in other times and cultural settings ... The main
reason this historical question is impOliant for sociologists is that we
have tended to view popular religious practices-especially those of
peasants, uneducated immigrants, and premodem times-as highly
tradition-bound, passively replicated and transmitted, and not at all
autonomously chosen. But what if traditional actions, such as
popular religious practice, are infonned also by individual and/or
collective eclecticism and bricolage?4o
We can see here a way of beginning to think about the situation of etlmography-since
etlmography (informed by phenomenological insights) is for McGuire the best access we
have to this individual bricolage-with relation to our three schemas above. Again, it
seems that ethnographic research will be fOlmd aligned with the poles of subjectivation
and particularization, and that etlmographies of religion can only tell us about localized
practices.
39 McGuire, Lived Religion, 64.
40 Ibid., 64.
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But McGuire is not arguing for a bare individualistic interpretation of religious
practices. She is fully aware that 'although lived religion peltains to the individual, it is
not merely subjective. Rather, people construct their religious worlds together, often
sharing vivid experiences of that intersubjective reality.'41 Following Berger and
Luckmanll, McGuire is careful to point out that 'individual religion is ... fwldamentally
social. Its building blocks are shared meanings and experiences, learned practices,
borrowed imagery, and imparted insights.'42 Elsewhere, McGuire points to Schutz's
metaphor of 'making music together' as a way of thinking about the common production
and maintenance of religious practices, as well as the ways in which embodiment in the
work of Foucault is peculiarly initiated through celtain sets of social practices.43
Nevertheless, McGuire's emphasis on the 'bricoleur' as the focus for
ethnographic research and for the creation and maintenance of religious practice risks
covering over these very social structures that she affirnls are constitutive for the
'bricoleur'. McGuire intentionally frames this emphasis against the distorted, true-for-
everyone-and-so-true-for-no-one, 'offIcial', macro-institutional picture of religion, but in
so doing she overstates her position with regard to the role that the creative, agential
individual plays in generating and sustaining religious practices over time. There is a
tension in the polarities of our schemas that cannot be so easily dismissed by aligning
41 Ibid., 12
42 Ibid., 13.
43 For the comments about Schutz, see ibid., 112-115; for the conm1ents about Foucault, see 118. McGuire
also attends to concel11S about embodiment in etlmographic research and writing in 'New-Old Directions in
the Social Scientific Study of Religion: Ethnography, Phenomenology, and the Human Body', in Personal
Knowledge and Beyond, 195-211.
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ethnographic research straightforwardly against and superior to macro~sociological
. 44
analysis.
Since McGuire makes substantial use ofthe metaphor ofbricolage in order to
explain her position, let us see how bricolage works in Levi-Strauss' own aCCOlmt. In the
context of The Savage A1ind, bricolage is described as a means of interacting with social
structures that 'expresses itself by means of a heterogeneous repertoire which, even if
extensive, is nevertheless limited' .45 The bricoleur's 'universe of instruments is closed
and the rules of his game are always to make do with "whatever is at hand", that is to say
with a set of tools and materials which is always tinite and is also heterogeneous,.46 The
resources of the bricoleur are both finite and heterogeneous because they are fully
contingent on what has come before, what is given, while at the same time being made
use of in such a way as to bring about something new. 47 The bricoleur 'has to turn back to
an already existent set made up of tools and materials, to consider or reconsider what it
contains and, finally and above all, to engage in a sort of dialogue with it and, before
choosing between them, to index the possible answers which the whole set can offer to
44 Again, we need to be careful not to over-generalize anyone ofthese positions. There are many ditIerent
kinds of macro-sociological analysis, and Stark's research, for example, looks quite a bit different from the
later writings of Peter Berger, though both are properly 'macro'.
45 Levi-Strauss, 177e Savage .Alind, 17. While this quote actually reters to 'mythical thought', in the next
sentence Levi-Strauss says that 'mythical thought is ... a kind of intellectual "bricolage''', so there is no
problem with employing his text in this way.
46 Ibid., 17.
47 Critiques of structuralism will eventually center on the essential incompatibility of these two aspects in
order to show up the pretenses of a 'closed' system.
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his problem' .48 Levi-Strauss is trying to show the fundamental tension that exists in the
creative and evolutionary projects of human sociality with the fact that the elements that
make up these projects are always 'pre-constrained' .49
This is exactly the tension that McGuire sets to work. But while she recognizes
the structure that Levi-Strauss analyzes, she nevertheless tends to privilege the creative
over the structural with respect to the actions of the bricoleur. Ethnographic research and
writing ought to be interested not in an emphasis of one of these poles over the other, but
in a maintenance of and contiguous reflection on the nature of this tension in the analysis
of social phenomena. While the individual is often the site or locus of particular
instantiations of religious practice, this particularity nevertheless invokes and maintains
objective structures that can be identified with reference to what the individual is not.
Robert Orsi develops a somewhat similar position as McGuire with regard to the
macro/micro polarity and the work that etlmography should be doing, although Orsi tends
to talk more about social fields or 'religious spaces', even though many examples have to
do with individual experiences (his own and his subjects,).50 However, rather than focus
on syncretic individual agency within any given scene of religious practice, Orsi focuses
on his own interpretation of what Geertz called (after Gilbert Ryle) the work of 'thick
description' in ethnographic research and writing. 51 However, Orsi is quick to point out
48 Ibid., 18.
49 Ibid., 19.
50 Orsi, Between Heaven and Earth, 167.
51 Clifford Geeliz, 'Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture', in The Interpretation of
Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 3-30.
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that the etlmographer is engaging with 'something messier than the controlled
marshalling ofletters on a page, something less predictable' and that this 'demands a
different kind of attentiveness'. 52 Orsi says that this realization 'is a call ... for attention to
religious messiness, to multiplicities, to seeing religious spaces as always, inevitably, and
profoundly intersected by things brought into them from outside, things that bear their
own histories, complexities, meanings different from those offered within the religious
space.,S3 But as we leamed from Becker, the researcher has to decide which details are
imp011ant, which are not, and how to thematize those details that remain. So the
ethnographer's job, in Orsi's language, is to try to clean up a little bit the messiness of the
social scene. But Orsi seems reticent to do this. Indeed, post-colonial critiques of
etlmography have largely been concemed with the essential coerciveness of such
cleaning up, and Orsi no less so. It is for this reason that Orsi and McGuire (and many
others) have recently begwl paying attention to the essentially intersubjective meaning-
making that occurs between researcher and subject, and the inability to effectively
separate these two in ethnographic reporting. 54
Orsi and McGuire are both interested in imp011ing insights from phenomenology
(and poststructuralism) into ethnographic research and writing. But what are the
implications of this imp011ation? Orsi wants to hold on to the imp011ance of an
irreducible messiness in ethnographic research and writing. McGuire, likewise, thinks
52 Orsi, Between Heaven and Earth, 164.
53 Ibid., 167.
54 See, for example, ibid., 170ff; and McGuire, 'New-Old Directions', passim. This has also been a
persistent theme in Michael Jackson's work, for example. See Minima Ethnographica; and Existential
Anthropology (New York: Bergham Books, 2005).
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that 'at the level of the individual, religion is not fixed, unitary, or even necessarily
coherent. Rather, each person's religious practices and the stories they use to make sense
of their lives are continually adapting, expanding or receding, and ever changing.' 55 Are
these commitments to messiness and instability compatible with the desire to import
phenomenological concems into etlmography?
To begin with, there is not 'phenomenology', but phenomenologies, so we need to
be clear what Orsi, McGuire and others are interested in when they talk about points of
intersection between ethnography and phenomenology. At the beginning of the chapter
we looked at a phenomenological tradition in sociology that is closely felt in
methodologies of social research. Examples of this are ethnomethodology, conversation
analysis, and the theories of social research and social phenomena derived from Schutz
and his New School colleagues. But McGuire and Orsi are just as interested in making
use of traditional phenomenological philosophy as they are in phenomenological theory
in sociology. While it is important in any given case that a clear delineation is made of
the way in which phenomenologies are utilized, I mean to keep open the possibility of
making use of any of them in ethnographic research.
McGuire clearly thematizes her main interest in bringing phenomenology into
etlmography by talking about the important implications of embodiment for etlmographic
research. Religious practices are essentially embodied practices, having to do with
material exchanges between practitioners and objects; ritualized movements and
behaviors; and celiain leamed ways of being that our bodies are culturally and
55 McGuire, Lived Religion, 210.
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organically bound to. McGuire points to the work of phenomenologists like Schutz and-
increasingly-Maurice Merleau-Ponty for critical insight into the relationships between
embodiment and meaning, religious or otherwise.
Orsi is more interested in a rather broad notion along the lines of 'thick
description', whereby the job of the ethnographer is to make real for the reader the
experience or the scene of religious practice that she is wTiting about. Besides the endless
richness of the physical, material aspects of any given scene-the ways in which that
richness keeps expanding, for example, from the pew to the aisle to the sanctuary to the
church to the street to the neighborhood to the city-there is an expansion of the
historical that is at least as overwhelming. Orsi quotes Marx: 'the tradition of all the dead
generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living'. 56 One is also reminded of
Faulkner's quip: 'The past is not dead. In fact, it's not even past'. Careful ethnography
must therefore pay attention to all of those things which are meaningful for understanding
any given religious social scene but which are 'different from those offered within the
1· . , 57re IglOUS space .
Much of what etlmographers of religion do is listen to stories that people tell
about their religious lived experience or lived practices. 58 McGuire and Orsi are
interested in insights from phenomenology because it is clear that all that is operative in a
given religious practice is not explicit, and that the religious practitioner is as likely as not
to be completely unaware of the operativity of a host of social structures, material
56 Orsi, Between Heaven and Earth, 153.
57 Ibid., 167.
58 Orsi borrows the term 'lived experience' from Sartre.
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contexts and histories that affect her own practices. This is why it was important, for
example, to point out the reciprocity or circuitousness of the practices ofthe bricoleur.
The bricoleur is both creative-agential, deliberative and active-and created-the very
practices of the bricoleur are determined by aspects of the toolbox, which is another
given, out of which the bricoleur creates. This is just as important for Orsi, even if he
thematizes it in different ways and with different emphases.
But it is important to note that McGuire and Orsi are not advocating a
straightforward phenomenological sociology. McGuire and Orsi are ethnographers, and
as we have noted in the introduction, ethnography is primarily about narratives, about
storytelling. How can phenomenological, socio-historical concems be inserted into
ethnographic writing? What does it mean to tell stories that account for these massive
contexts with which theorists like McGuire and Orsi are concerned?
28
CHAPTER III
ETHNOGRAPHY AS CRITICAL STORYTELLING
Etlmographers are storytellers. Compelling etlmographic writing brings to life the
social scenes of its subjects. But as a social-scientific practice, good ethnographies of
religion do more than tell stories, even if that 'more' is done largely through storytelling.
It might be better to say that in the context of the etlmography of religion storytelling
does particular things, and that the concept of storytelling is rich and heterogeneous. So it
is important that we try to get clear about what we mean by storytelling, first of all, and
then, what do we mean by storytelling in the context of the etlmography of religion. This
will lead us into a consideration of what it is that ethnographies of religion accomplish-
or what they ought to accomplish-and how they accomplish it. My central claim will be
that good etlmographic writing brings together storytelling and insights from
phenomenology, and that tlle particular ways that this is accomplished introduce ditIerent
kinds of ambiguity and instability into ethnographic writing. The consequences of this
ambiguity and instability-which are ethical consequences-will then be addressed in
Chapter IV.
To begin with, storytelling is always done by someone and/or someone. It is
certainly possible to tell a story to oneself, but the purpose of storytelling is to give an
account. In her book Giving an Account ofOneself, Judith Butler argues that the very
structure of giving an accolmt relies upon certain modes of 'subjectivation' that implicate
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a definite social context in any accounting. 59 So storytelling is a fundamentally social
practice. Why do we tell stories'? We tell stories because someone asks us to, either
implicitly or explicitly. Stories are explanations, explanations that take the fonn of a
narrative. Stories are told in response to questions like 'Who are you,?,60, 'What are you
doing?', 'Why are you doing that?', 'What are you all about?'
We could say, then, following Michael Jackson's fOllllulation of Halmah Arendt,
that 'storytelling is a strategy for transforming private into public meanings'. 61 But of
course-and Jackson emphasizes this-we do not live our lives as narratives or as
stories. Stories al'e constructed, pieced together from the memories of storytellers in order
to coml1llmicate paliicular meanings in paliicular contexts. Jackson questions claims by
some theorists that, as he quotes Alasdair MacIntyre, 'stories are lived before they al'e
told,.62 Stories provide frameworks, structures and celiain ways of making sense out of
the world and the storyteller's relation to the world that are not immanent to the life or
lives that are given an accounting in the story. We do not live stories but we tell stories
about our lives.
Neveliheless, we give meaning to our lives and make sense out of what we are
doing in the world by telling stories. Our lives are defined by narratives that we create as
59 Judith Butler, Giving an Account ofOnese?f(New York: Fordham, 2005), 17. Though used in different
contexts and incorporating somewhat distinct conceptual frameworks, Butler's use of the term
'subjectivation' (drawn from Foucault) can be tentatively aligned with the way that Berger and Luclilllann
use that tenn in The Social Construction ofReality.
60 Butler, Giving an Account ofOneself, 30.
61 Michael Jackson, The Politics ofStOlytelling (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanu1l1 Press, 2002),14-15.
62 Jackson, The Politics ofStOlytelling, 18.
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much as by the narratives that create us.63 But the stories that we tell are always
changing. We are always telling stories, changing our story, adding new stories, or
getting rid of stories. When we meet someone at a bar or at a conference, we tell her a
StOly or a set of stories as a way for them to have access to 'who I am'. These stories are
often polyvalent, accomplishing a number of conu11lmicative goals in a single telling.
And the same story might be used for different purposes in different contexts. Most of us
are for the most part good storytellers-in varying degrees-who do not merely plod
along with 'and then... and then... and then... '. We shape our stories in strategic ways and
incorporate various contexts in order to frame our selves or our stories' subjects in
particular ways.
Our stories are always changing. As Butler points out,
in the making of the story, I create myself in new form, instituting a
narrative "I" that is superadded to the "I" whose past life I seek to
telL The narrative "I effectively adds to the story every time it tries
to speak, since the "I" appears again as the narrative perspective,
and this addition cannot be fully narrated at the moment in which it
provides the perspectival anchor for the narration in question.64
We can easily see this when we pay attention to the way we tell a certain story. If I run
into an old teacher from my undergraduate school just weeks after having been turned
63 This is another way of thinking the paradoxical schema that we introduced in Chapter II from Berger and
Luckmann, where 'subjective meanings' can be lU1derstood as the stories we tell and 'objective facticities'
as those stories into which we are bom and whose particular 'modes of subj ectivation' make us into the
particular kind of storytelling beings that we are.
64 Butler, Giving an Account ofOnese(f, 36.
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down for a job, the story that I might tell him of my graduate work and 'what I am doing'
might take on a completely different shape and tone then if I meet him a year later after
having earned a fellowship and researching for a book, and tell him the 'same story'.
So then, as Jackson points out, it is not quite right to say that we live stories, or
that 'we are the stories we tell' .65 But we do make sense of our lives by telling stories.
Mark Freeman characterizes this dichotomous relationship between our stories and our
lives by saying that 'I am living episodes ...but I do not yet know the plot of the story to
which they belong' .66 Freeman argues that our stories about ourselves are continually
being revised in light of what comes next. This continual 'rewriting' of the self shapes
our past in accordance with whatever mold is definitive of our life at the time of the
telling. The interpretive stance that we take up in telling a story weighs heavily on the
history and memory that we narrate. 'The ending we are... determines both the beginning
and indeed the essential nature of how we came to be. ,67 Storytelling thus confers new
frameworks, new ways of making meaning, on remembered actions.
I argued above that storytelling is a fundamentally social activity, insofar as it is
always an accounting by someone and for someone. I also noted that storytelling allows
us to shape our lives and make sense out of what we are doing in the world, but that we
are at the same time shaped by certain stories that we have not created. Jackson points to
something similar in his reading of Arendt. For Arendt, Jackson argues, 'stories and
65 Jackson, The Politics ofStorytelling, 18.
66 Mm'k Freeman, Rewriting the Self: HistOlJ', MemOlY. Narrative (London: Routledge, 1993), 29.
67 Freeman, Rewriting the Self; 30.
storytelling are shared activities'. 68 But this means more than what we have already
pointed out about the structure of storytelling. Jackson argues that 'stories take us out of
ourselves,.69 Storytelling situates the perspective of the teller in a context that is larger
than herself. Stories imply worlds.
The implication of worlds in storytelling means that the teller cannot give a full
accolmting of her own story, as it were. Stories are never 'tell-alls'. As Butler points out,
narratives are always 'disoriented by what is not mine, or not mine alone' ,70 We are able
to tell stories because of stories, that is, because of narratives that have made us the
particular kind of storyteller that we are and of which we have a thin grasp. The
consequence of this is that we 'will not be able to be very authoritative when we try to
give a full account with a narrative structure.'
The "I" can tell neither the story of its own emergence nor the
conditions of its own possibility without bearing witness to a state of
affairs to which one could not have been present, which are prior to
one's own emergence as a subject who can lmow, and so constitute a
set of origins that one can narrate only at the expense of
authoritative knowledge.71
6S Jackson, The Politics ~rStOfytelling, 252,
69 Ibid" 252,
70 Butler, Giving an Account ~rOnese1j; 37.
71 Ibid" 37,
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This means that any story-what we might think of in the context of Chapter II as a
particular or subjective nanative-implicates in its very telling that which is outside of it
and which conditions it-what we might think of as the institutional or objective. What
does this mean for the work and accomplishment of storytelling?
First of all, it means that part of the accomplislunent of storytelling is to address
what Arendt calls the 'in-between space' at the intersection ofthe private and the public,
which I think: we could also call the intersection of subjectivation and objectivation, or of
the particular and the generaL 72 When I tell the 'story of my life' to someone, what I am
doing is giving an account of my subjectivity-my subjectivated being-by way of that
which is outside of my subjectivity, those events, institutions, and contexts in viliue of
which I understand how I am.
So storytelling is a precise and strategic way that one can address the
Durkheimian paradox that Garfinkel, Berger and LuclQ11aIUl identified in their work. But
what is the relationship between ethnography and storytelling? Much of what I have said
so far has to do with auto-narration, with telling one's own story. As Karen McCarthy
Brown writes, 'each of us moves through the world making meaning, individually and
collectively, as we can and/or need to,.73 But the work of the etlUlographer is not the
work of making sense of her own world-whether individual or shared-but 'making
meaning out of others' processes of meaning making' .74 RetlIDling for a moment to
72 Jackson, The Politics ()j'Stor)'telling, 11,252.
73 Brown, lviama Lola, x.
74 Ibid., xi.
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Becker's schema for social research, we can see the affinities between Brown's reflection
on her work and Becker's framework. Making meaning is in pmi a process of 'weeding
out extraneous detail and exposing basic structures', as Becker writes. 75 Stories tell their
'users' what is and is not impOltant contextually in order to understand the subject of the
story. Stories tell about their subjects but saying things about how their subjects fit into
what is outside of them-the private by way of the public, the pmiicular by way of the
generaL the subjective by way of the objective.
Following Brown, we can say that ethnography is telling stories about others'
stories. There may be other ways to fODlmlate this, for example that ethnographers tell
stories for others. In the preface to the 2001 republication oflvJama Lola Brown deals
with the question of how to understand the kind of storytelling that she is doing. She
writes: 'Who got to speak in this book and from what perspective? ..Rather than resolving
itself with a single answer, the tension behind this question eased only when dozens of
voices emerged simultaneously...My voices were several.' 76 For Brown the fonnally
designated relationship between resemcher and subject became problematized in her
research and writing, and this problematization was for Brown exactly what it made it
possible for her to write .Mama Lola. Brown wrote that her 'job' as etlmographer was 'to
see that each voice got hem'd' .77
75 Becker, Telling About Society, 93.
76 Brown, Nlama Lola, ix.
77 Ibid., ix.
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Though Brown is certainly right that ethnographers' research and writing reveal
the instability of the researcher-subject relationship, it is impOliant that ethnographies of
religion attempt to maintain a distance or distinction between their subjects' stories and
the stories that are written in the etlmographies.78 There is a critical distinction between
telling stories about others' stories and telling stories for others. The job of the
ethnographer is of the former kind. Telling stories about others' stories means that the
stories that the ethnographer tells give an accOlmt ofthe 'in-between spaces' that
incorporates the etlmographer's own critical framing and shaping of the story, rather than
simply re-inscribing the shape ofthe story as told by the subject. Of course, the
etlmographer no more than the subject can give an authoritative or final account of her
subject. Nevertheless, it is precisely the job of social-scientific researchers to give critical
and rigorous accounts of social scenes and social structlU'es. So while ethnographies
cannot guarantee their analysis deductively along the lines of certain popular methods of
quantitative research, they can still produce critical accolmts that answer celiain questions
about society and reveal or tell knowledge about a social scene that was previously
unavailable or untold, oftentimes even or especially for ethnographies' subj ects.
As for any kind of social scientific research and analysis, the ethnographer of
religion is out to answer certain questions about religious practice and religious social
scenes. One of the questions for the etlmographer-in both her research and her
78 I am not saying that Brown fails to maintain this distinction. She is very aware of it, even if it is always a
contested distinction. See for example, xii-xiii and 10-12. See also Courtney Bender, Heaven's Kitchen:
Living Religion at God's Love We Deliver (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 143-151; and
Marion S. Goldman, Passionate Journeys: Why Succes.~rul Women Joined A Cult (Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press, 1999),49-59.
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writing-is how to go about answering the question. As Becker pointed out, 'every way
of doing things is perfect-for something' .79 One pmi of answering this question involves
situating the resem'ch m1d writing somewhere within the polarities of the schemas that we
considered in Chapter II. As storytelling, etlmography can accomplish this in various
ways. The way that the ethnographer chooses to shape the stories that she tells detennines
what those stories tell, and what aspects of a religious practice or social scene are made
'1 bl . h .. 80aVal a e 111 t e wnt111g.
The examples oftmee recent etlmographies of religion reveal the complexity and
contingency of storytelling in a social-scientific context. Courtney Bender's book
Heaven's Kitchen: Living Religion at God's Love We Deliver gives an account of how
'people practice religion in their daily activities', and she asks this question specifically
in the 'non-religious' context of members' talk in the kitchen at God's Love We
Deliver. 81 Brown's book A1ama Lola tells the story of'Alourde's day-to-day practice of
Haitim1 Vodou' , though the way that Brown tells this story involves bringing to bear a
thick collection of stories that coalesce in Alourde. 82 And Marion S. Goldmal1's
Passionate Journeys: Why Successful Women Joined A Cult gives a rich, detailed
79 Becker, Telling About Society, 72.
80 While not the focus ofthis essay, it is impOltant to note that the framing of etlmographic research as
much as the writing detetmines the shape that a story will take, the way it gives an account of its subject.
For example, 1. Shawn Landres, 'Being (in) the Field: Defining Ethnography in Southern California and
Central Slovakia', in Personal Knowledge and Beyond, 100-112. Landres writes on 102: ' ... ret1exive
antllropologists observe that the so-called field itself exists, if at all, only because the ethnographer says it
does. Each scholar defines the "field" in each given project, and in some cases the "field" only exists
because the scholar sees a coherence visible perhaps only to hil11- or herself..
81 Bender, Heaven '.I' Kitchen viii.
82 Brown, }.llama Lola, xv.
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narrative accOlUlt of the lives of some women who moved to Oregon in the early 1980's
to live communally lUlder the spiritual leadership of Baghwan Shree Rajneesh. A
consideration of the heterogeneous methods of shaping ethnographic stories in these three
examples demonstrates the various ways that ethnographies of religion can be situated
within the schemas of social research that we discussed in Chapter II, as well as reveal
aspects of etlmographic writing that we will determine to be ethical in Chapter IV.
Bender frames the question of her research in a way that enables her to tell a fairly
straightforward-if rich and polyvalent-story of the ways in which religion is practiced
in everyday situations, situations which themselves would not normally be classified as
religious. Her purpose in doing so is to address what she sees as a widespread problem in
sociology: 'Sociologists lmow remarkably little about how people practice religion in
their daily activities, including work, volunteering, and other interactions with
acquaintances and friends. ,83 She does this by focusing her research and writing on a
nanowly delineated social situation, that ofthe everyday talk of volunteers at a kitchen in
New York City that prepares meals for home delivery for people with AIDS. Within this
carefully circumscribed scene ofresearch Bender relates the volunteers' talk to ways of
thinking about social interaction that are 'multivalent' and that show up the ambiguity of
the concept of 'shared cultures' or 'shared meaning'. 84 Like McGuire, Bender is
interested in lived religion, and this means looking at the how of religious practices in
social settings. She asks specific questions, which she thinks need to be asked in any case
83 Bender, Heaven's Kitchen, viii.
84 Ibid., viii-ix. Bender is suspicious of the flippancy of references to 'shared meaning', arguing instead for
a 'heteroglossic' understanding of talk in social scenes. See 139-141.
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in order to begin to give an adequate social-scientific account of religious practices:
'How and when did volunteers decide to talk about religion-their own or others? When
did "situations occur" in which people talked about it? How did people recognize others'
talk or practice as religious? How did otherwise mundane practices influence this talk?,85
The questions that Bender identifies about both religious practice and social
interaction mean that she has to tell the story of the stories at God's Love We Deliver in a
specific way. Her attention to the detail of what Garfinkel calls 'the witnessably recurrent
details of ordinary everyday practices' means that she is not often able to tell other stories
that could otherwise be told in order to give an account of the volunteers' talk. 86 Put
differently, celiain stories that could otherwise be told do not answer the questions that
Bender is after, or do not make available the phenomena that she is interested in. The
story of one of the volunteer's experiences with religion throughout her life likely will
not show up-or will show up only in precisely circumscribed and truncated ways-in a
discussion about various traditions of eating and celebrating during Passover/Easter. 87
But Bender is not interested in Heaven's Kitchen with the religious histories of the
volunteers-although aspects of these histories inevitably emerge. (And Bender's
methodology also included open-ended interviews with the volunteers wherein much
more of this came out. But not first of all in her analyses of volunteers' talk.)88
85 Ibid., 131.
86 GarfInkel, Ethnomethodology's Program, 97.
87 Cf. Bender, Heaven's Kitchen, 99-103.
88 For a discussion of how Bender thinks her interviews relate to her analysis of volunteers' talk, see ibid"
136-139.
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The question for Bender is how to 'pay attention to the history of any interaction,
as far as we can, and attend to the palticular interactions that precede each... ,89 But what
does this mean? What exactly is 'as far as we can'? What would be 'the entire context
and history of any single event', which Bender identifies as the ideal but impossible goal
for the accounting of ethnography?9o Bender casts a wide net in her theoretical
framework by to some extent implicating just about everything in the possible meaning-
making of a given social scene. This view resonates with Orsi's insistence on paying
continual attention to the 'messiness' of religious scenes, the ways in which the contexts
and phenomena that are at play in attempts to give an account of a religious scene are
never fully detemlinable or available. On this view, we could think of the social worlds
that Bender and Orsi propose as a sort of monadic system, where any given social scene
is a coalescence of all infinitely expanding contextual framework that-ideally but
impossibly-would take account ofjust all of the material, social and psychological
existences that feed into that social scene. But of course, for Bender and Orsi, it is an
open system and so such an accounting is never possible. Moreover, such an accounting
would really not be an accounting at all, since as Becker writes, 'knowing everything
means knowing nothing...Not everything is interesting or useful to us' .91 Bender is not
proposing that etlmographies aspire to be 'tell-aIls'. Consistent with the way that we
described storytelling generally above, Bender writes that etlmography 'provides methods
89 Ibid., 138.
90 Ibid., 139.
91 Becker, Telling About Society, 93.
40
for seeing how the relations between people's languages, scripts, and frames are put to
use within specific contexts,.92
If Bender's etlmography is about the 'whats' and 'hows' ofreligious practice,
Brown does not limit herself to the analysis of social interactions in the same way in
Mama Lola. Moreover, she generally does not employ the same kind of explicit
theorizing as Bender, instead opting to leave her 'theorizing embedded in stories'. Brown
gives a different definition than Bender of the work of ethnography, though it still hews
closely to the broad account of storytelling above. For Brown, 'the ethnographer
studies ... how people create meaning or significance in their lives, how they interpret
objects and events: 93 This echoes the quote from Brown above that etlmography's work
is to make meaning out of others' meaning making. But Brown explicitly blurs the lines
between telling stories about others' stories and telling stories for others. Brown thinks
that 'the people who are being studied should be allowed to speak for themselves
whenever possible, for they are the only true expetis on themselves' .94 This is no doubt
true in one sense, and it has been to the detriment of the social sciences in the past
century that they have all too often failed to listen to their subjects, or to ask what it
means to listen. Nevertheless, that a subject is 'expeti' does not mean that she explicitly
knows what she is doing in a social scene or can contextualize her meaning making
activities with any kind of critical rigor. It is the role of the ethnographer to tell critical
92 Bender, Heaven's Kitchen, 139.




stories about others' stories, since others' stories are not always critical, and in any case
they are never authoritative.
Brown's book present an extraordinary story abollt Alourdes, a Haitian Vodou
priestess living in New York City. But part of what is at stake in Arfama Lola is precisely
who the story is about and who is telling the story. Brown quickly realized in her research
that she was not going to be able to do the research that she wanted to if she did not give
up certain conceptions about the appropriate role between researcher and subject. The
way that she approached the research was integral to the availability of celtain aspects of
Alourdes' world. Brown writes about the problem she faced:
People bring the burdens and pains oftheir lives to this religious
system [Vodou] in the hope of being healed. I realized that if I
brought less to this Vodou world, I would come away with less. If I
persisted in studying Vodou objectively, the heart of the system, its
ability to heal, would remain closed to me. The only way I could
hope to understand the pyschodrama of Vodou was to open my own
life to the ministrations of Alourdes. 95
The risk and openness involved in this kind of research was necessary for Brown to gain
the access to the subject that she was interested in. One of the results of this was that it
implicated Brown in her own research and writing, so that she ended writing herself into
the story of Mama Lola. Among other positive consequences that Brown thinks result
from such a strategy of ethnographic storytelling, she sees it as 'a reasonable strategy for
95 Ibid., 10. Brackets mine.
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acknowledging the trenchant critiques of etlmographic representation coming out of post-
colonial and cultural studies'.96 We will return to this aspect of Brown's writing in
Chapter IV.
Perhaps the most controversial method of storytelling that Brown employed was
the fictionalizing of Alourde's family history in the book. Alternating chapters give
fictional accounts of people in Alourde's ancestry, based on stories that Brown heard,
often many times and from many people, over the course of her research. She argues that
this approach allowed her to tap 'a reservoir of casual and imagistic knowledge' that is
difficult to incorporate into traditional ethnographic writing.97 Brown points out that, for
all of our earnest historiographical concerns with 'what really happened', history-telling
does not work like that. Like other kinds of storytelling, histories are told in order to give
particular kinds of accounting. 98 What is important in history-telling for HaitiffilS,
according to Brown, is the 'relevffilce ffild liveliness' of the history.99 The telling and
retelling of these histories makes them alive in the present context of their telling in
particular ways. Stories are told for reasons. The truth of their telling has to do with how
they speak to their hearers. For this reason Brown said that her aim in fictionalizing these
histories was to 'make up true stories', in the service oftelling Alourdes' family history
in the way that history is for Alourdes.
96 Brown, 'Writing about "the Other," Revisited', 133.




Like Bender, the way that Brown shaped the story of Mama Lola detemlined what
the story could say. In Brown's case, her goal was to 'create a portrait of Vodou
embedded in the vicissitudes of particular lives' .100 She accomplished this with complex
storytelling and the incorporation of a 'chorus of voices', different perspectives from
which the story of Alourdes was told. lOI Brown inscribed within the text itself the
reflexive problematic ofjust whose story is being told in ethnographic writing. The voice
of the narrative was at stake in her own writing as much as in the telling and retelling of
the histories that gave meaning to Alourdes and the people in her world. We can see in
Brown's attention to these aspects of her subjects the fluidity and instability oflived
religious practice that McGuire is interested in bringing to the fore of social-scientific
research in religion. Brown shows that the instability of lived religion extends beyond
rituals, practices and material contexts into the very stories that give meaning to these to
begin with.
The case of Goldman's research and writing for Passionate Journeys is somewhat
more complex than that of Brown due to the circumstances surrounding her subjects. 102
Her intention was to give an account of why some women joined a cult. The controversy
surrounding the group required Goldman to balance 'confidentiality and authenticity' .103
Goldman wanted to know why women with successfil1 and seemingly fulfilling lives
decided to join a new religious movement in the high plains deseli of Eastern Oregon.
100 Ibid" IS,
101 Ibid" 15,
102 See the Epilogue to Passionate Journeys, 249-268.
103 Ibid" 45,
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The 'why' in the question is perhaps already to resituate the sociological question in a
direction different from Bender or Brown. A 'why' question implies that reasons must be
given, reasoning as an answer to a question. When one is asked 'why did you do this?',
one is being asked to given a reasonable account. Goldman wanted to tell the story of
some women who moved to Rajneeshpuram. To do that, she had to ask them, among
other questions and in many different ways, 'Why did you do this?' And those that she
interviewed told her stories, which was what Goldman was looking for. Her access to
these narratives was precisely through the subjects who offered the narratives. In a
sociological account that asks the questions that Goldman was interested in and that relies
on the extensive interview process that she used as the bases for her narratives, this is
necessarily just the way she had access to the information she was after.
We have already noted the inherently vicissitudinous nature of storytelling and
the construction of self-narratives. But it is not as if the researcher is in a better position.
We tell stories from where we are, and while we can and should attempt to think
critically about the implications of this, telling stories from where we are is just what
storytelling is. Furthermore, part of what Goldman was interested in was 'the myriad
ways that women attempt to find themselves through achievement, intimate relationships,
or charismatic cOimections' .104 Her intention was to recount the life histories of some of
the women who ended up at Rajneeshpuram, to show how they were satisfied in the
teachings of Rajneesh, and perhaps to see how these two were nOimatively related. The
first two things Goldman accomplishes by giving in-depth histories of the sannyasins'
104 Ibid., 6.
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lives. It is less clear the extent to which her research can give us access to generalized
examinations of'how specific kinds of personal attributes and life experiences predispose
some women to search for their identities within cults or in some other defining
relationships' .105 Goldman's methods raise interesting questions about the possible
intersection between qualitative research methods and generalizing theoretical
frameworks for understanding religious practice, and her use of both rational choice
theory and psychoanalytic sociology are rare in etlmographic research and writing.
Paliially because of the sensitive context in which her research and writing took
place, and partially in an effort to tell the stories that she wanted to tell, Goldman
constructed three 'anchored composite' narratives based on extended 'research
conversations' that she had with women at Rajneeshpuram. 106 This method was the result
of the dual imperatives issuing from research to keep secrets and speak truth. 107 She cites
Brown as an inspiration for her work, although she notes that where Brown utilized
wholesale invention in parts of her book, Goldman 'circumscribed [her] inventions,
grounding each major life history theme in explicit biographical infonnation' .108 The
eleven women from whom Goldman drew stories are represented in various ways in the
composites. Against those critics who might argue that creating such 'fictionalized'
accounts cmmot cmmt as social-scientific research, Goldman points out that this is just
105 Ibid., 214.
106 Marion S. Goldman, 'Voicing Spiritualities: Anchored Composites as an Approach to Understanding
Religions COl11lllitment', in Personal Knowledge and Beyond, 146-161. 152.




what sociologists do all the time in social-scientific writing when they 'pull together
quotations from a number of individuals to illustrate a particular point' .109
Goldman's use of composite narratives presents us with yet another way of
expanding the use of storytelling in ethnographies of religion. In Goldman's case her
narratives were able to incorporate the individual stories of several women; to tell their
stories critically; and to attempt by way of this storytelling to generalize their' shared
th ' 110pa s.
In the three examples of ethnographic storytelling above we see three very
different ways of framing stories and asking sociological questions. In each case the
ethnographer is interested in saying something about what stories do and how they do it.
In each case their stories do something different in order to address specific sociological
questions that frame their research and writing. Moreover, in each case the etlmographer
offers a compelling and extremely rich account of religious practice and experience.
Despite their diversity in focus and method, they all accomplish the social-scientific work
that they set out to do. What does this tell us about social-scientific research and writing,
and specifically, the etlmography ofreligion?
It points first of all to the fundamentally heterogeneous nature of ethnographic
research and writing. The accomplishments of ethnography are detennined pmiially by
the questions that the ethnographer is after and partially by the subject ofthe research and
writing. This is to take seriously, if critically, Becker's assertion that everything is perfect
109 Ibid., 159.
110 See Goldman, Passionate Journeys, 213-248.
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for something. There are reasons for accounting their subject's stories in just the way that
our ethnographers above tell them. How the story is framed-that is, how the subjective
is related to the objective, the private to the public, the particular to the general-and the
kinds of stories that are being asked and told-that is, which subjectivities and
objectivities, which private and which public, which particular and which general-
requires various, contingent and tentative ways of storytelling in order to make sense out
of others' stories.
I argued above that storytelling is a precise and strategic way to address the
relationship between the subjective and the objective. We see in the examples ofBender,
Brown and Goldman that the way a story is told is at least as important as the kinds of
stories that ethnographers choose to tell. Since ethnographers tell critical social-scientific
stories about others' stories (and do not tell others' stories), the question of what way to
tell stories is as much a question of theory as it is about narrative structure or the
construction of the narrative. In the case of Brown, her theorizing is 'embedded in
stories' .111 But this means that she is still aware of 'doing' theory, and even her decision
to leave theorizing in the narratives is justified by her appeal to theory. The way that
Goldman constructed her narratives meant that the stories she told were about a specific
group of sannyasins as much as they were about the individual women that she
interviewed. Whereas Brown's writing intentionally problematizes the ability to identify
'whose voice' is present in a narrative, Goldman's approach to ethnographic writing in
Passionate Journeys challenges straightforward assumptions about how etlmographers
III Brown, "Mama Lola, 15.
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are supposed to relate the individual to the collective, the particular to the universal. All
three ethnographers discovered that successful storytelling in ethnography required
bringing into tension in their research and writing the traditional distinctions between
researcher and subject. As Bender writes, 'ethnography happened as I let myself speak
and stopped merely listening' .112
The three etlmographies above attend in different ways to the contingent, fragile
and unstable nature of ethnographic research and writing, and these characteristics show
up in various ways in their writing. In the next chapter I will argue that a persistent and
critical reflexivity is important for addressing these characteristics of the ethnography of
religion, and that such a reflexivity is an inherently ethical practice within ethnographic
writing.
112 Bender, Heaven's Kitchen, 149.
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CHAPTER IV
FRAGILITY, CONTINGENCY, AND REFLEXIVITY:
ETHNOGRAPHIC ETHICS
In what follows I am going to develop a way of thinking about ethnographic
research and writing that accounts for the critical reflexivity that is necessary in order to
attend to the instability and fragility inherent in ethnographic storytelling. Drawing on
insights from some of the ethnographers and theorists whose work I engaged above, I
attempt to show that ethnographic storytelling is a fundamentally ethical practice. After
framing the question of the ethical in ethnography in light of Chapters II and III, I tum to
the recent work of Stephen K. White to offer a framework in which to think about the
ethical activity of ethnographic storytelling that preserves both the rigor that is sought in
social-scientific research and the unavoidable fragility of storytelling.
Reflecting on her research at Rajneeshpuram, Goldman wrote: 'Perhaps my
research would have worked out differently if I had worn something in a sunrise color on
my first visit to the ranch,.113 This is a beautiful and sublime acknowledgement ofthe
central problem with which we will be concerned in this last chapter. Goldman's
hypothetical elision points to how the ethnographer is implicated in her research in any
case. The ethnographer's presence both shapes and is shaped by the subject of her work,
and part of what is at stake in ethnographic research is interrogating the distinction
113 Goldman, Passionate Journeys, 53. In reference to the colors of the robes wom by Rajneesh's followers.
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between etlmographer and subject. The researcher's presence in a religious scene
introduces into the practices of that scene an 'outsider' who needs to be taken into
account in those practices. The ethnographer is accounted for by being given a role to
perfonn-for example, in the kind of participant observation that Goldman makes use
of-and to perform with. 114
This means that the very possibility of etlmographic research and writing involves
the researcher in her subject. As Brown and others point out, this has become a
commonplace critique of or 'problem' for etlmography.ll5 However, the force ofthis
critique assumes that there would be access to the ethnographic subject that could avoid
the infringement of the researcher on her subject. Such an assumption betrays a
commitment to certain positivist conceptions of social-scientific research that have been
subject to at least as much scmtiny and criticism as post-colonial critiques of
ethnography.
Rather than look for strategies that could resist such criticisms of etlmographic
research and writing, ethnographers ought to acknowledge their own implication in their
scenes of research. Bender, Brown and Goldman all do this in different ways. Bender and
Brown write themselves as characters into their narratives. Goldman's account of her
methodology is in pati a reflexive consideration of how her approach to research shaped
the discoveries and narratives that made their way into her book.
114 See Lanch'es, 'Being (in) the Field', 106-107.
115 Brown, 'Writing about the "Other," Revisited', 133.
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Michael Jackson argues for just these kinds of reflexive inscriptions in
etlmographic research and writing, which he argues lay bare the importance of paying
attention to various aspects of intersubjectivity in social researchY6 He writes: ' ... the
ethnographic method demands not merely an imaginative participation in the life of the
other, but a practical and social involvement in the various activities, both ritual and
mundane, that contextualize and condition the other's worldview,.m TIlls way of
approaching social research-which 'perhaps no other intellectual discipline'
accomplishes-' abolishes the subj ect-obj ect split of natural science'. 118 ] ackson argues
that this implies an irreducibly dialectic accomplislmlent:
For wIllIe the etlmographer is both influenced by his or her initial
preoccupations and by the other's self-understandings, the outcome
of any intersubjective encowlter is never a synthesis of all the
various points of view taken together, but an arbitrary closure that
leaves both self and other with a provisional and open-ended view
that demands further dialogue and engagement.1l9
The question for the ethnographer is how to think about and acknowledge this kind of
open-endedness in her writing. Just as we saw in Chapter III that ways of ethnographic
storytelling are heterogeneous in alliance with their goals and contexts, so the inclusion
116 See for example, Jackson, Minima Ethnographica, 1-36. Robert Orsi, bOlTowing from Sartre, develops a
similar lmderstanding of the natme of social research in Between Heaven and Earth. He quotes Sartre:
'Research is a relationship ... and the relationship itself must be interpreted as a moment of this history',
174.




of a persistent reflexivity in ethnography will be variously shaped by the kinds of stories
that are being told and the way in which they are being told. Such an approach to
ethnographic writing shows up the irreducible interpellations of researcher and subject,
researcher and ethnographic wTiting, and ethnographies and readers.
How, then, are we supposed to evaluate the accomplishments of etlmographies of
religion? If any ethnographic accOlmt is subject to tentative, unstable, contingent and
fragile ways of telling stories about others' stories, is there any way to make judgments
about the success or failure of these accounts? What are we left with? Can we ever get
past the multiplicity of critical and competing voices that are telling stories about a given
religious scene, for example, in order to come to some kind of knowledge or
understanding about it? Is this not what social-scientific research and analysis is after?
Richard Keamey addresses this problem, in a slightly different context, in an
interview with Paul Ricoeur:
[If] you allow many different interpretations ... and if you claim that
the healthy thing is a conflict of interpretations which disallows any
fInal consensus-since there is no one perspective from which to
say what really happened-how can you talk of the abuse of
memory ... ? If there are only competing interpretations, each with a
claim on truth, how can we speak of truth or wltruth in history? To
speak of abuse assumes you have some perspective from which you
53
can judge that someone is making a proper use of memory, and that
someone is making an improper use of memory.120
Ricoeur responds rather straightforwardly that 'in a sense what "really happened" must
keep concerning us' .121 We must not resign ourselves to a conflict of interpretations, even
if conflict always reemerges in discourse. Ricoeur argues that even if we can never
fInally tell the truth, we neveliheless have to continue to be concerned with the truth. He
maintains that conflict between narratives is inherent in how the construction of
narratives works. Indeed, we saw this in Chapter III when looking at Freeman's claim
that storytelling is always situated as the present telling about the past, thereby ensuring
that there will be conflicts between narratives even when those narratives are told by the
same person.
So how can we understand the accomplishments of ethnographic storytelling if
another story can always be told and we do not have recourse to an incontestable
epistemological framework to which we might appeal in order to guarantee that one way
of telling the story about a religious scene trumps another? Since these narratives can
never be so sure of themselves, since there is always the possibility of critique with
regard to the origins, figurations and shapes of ethnographic stories, how are we to
adjudicate the good from the bad in ethnographic accomplishments? How can we
maintain responsibility and care for telling the truth and enriching the understanding of
120 Paul Ricoem, 'Imagination, Testimony and Trust: A Dialogue with Paul Ricoeur', in Questioning
Ethics: ContemporalJ' Debates in Philosophy, eds. Richard Keamey and Mark Dooley (London:
Routledge, 1999), 14. For ft.uther reflections along these lines, see Keamey's book On Stories (London:
Routledge, 2002).
121 Ricoeur, 'Imagination, Testimony and Trust', 15.
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religious practice if we cmmot guarantee the epistemological success of our stories along
the lines of natural-scientific models oftmth? Since we saw above that storytelling
cannot be aligned with the circumscription of knowledge so defined, how should we
think about and understand 'truth telling' in ethnographic narratives?
I suggest that the recent work of political theorist Stephen K. White offers a
fruitful and promising framework in which to account for this appm'ent tension between
telling the tmth about religious scenes-the properly understood work of etlmographic
storytelling-and the epistemological critiques that ethnographic research and writing has
been so heavily exposed to. After articulating White's framework in relation to
ethnographic storytelling-and pointing out some parallels with theorists we have already
considered, especially Judith Butler-I will conclude by saying something about why this
framework should be understood as primarily ethical in its application to the ethnography
of religion.
In his book Sustaining Affirmation: The Strengths of Weak Ontology in Political
Theory, White otTers a fran1ework for the articulation, cultivation and affirmation of
fundamental narratives in ethical-political life that takes into account the fragility,
instability and uncertainty that we treated with regard to storytelling in Chapter III. 122
White is interested in getting past what he see as the stultifying efTects of so-called
122 Stephen K. White, Sustaining Affirmation: The Strengths ofWeak Ontology in Political Theory
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). See also the Special Issue of The Hedgehog Review 7 (2):
2005, entitled Commitments in a Post-Foll11dationalist World: Exploring the Possibilities of "Weak
Ontology", which is devoted to discussions of White's book. His contribution to the Special Issue, 'Weak
Ontology: Genealogy and Critical Issues', is on 11-25. White's newest book, The Ethos ofa Late-Modern
Citizen (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2009), continues to develop some of the ideas in Sustaining
Affirmation. The language of articulation, cultivation and affIrmation can be found on Sustaining
Affirmation, 8ff.
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postmodem or 'late modem' theory on ethical and political discourse, patiially because
he recognizes that ethical and political discourse have not ceased in light of these
critiques. 123 While this fommlation might seem somewhat coy, the point here is that he
wants to 'shift the intellectual burden... from a preoccupation with what is opposed atld
deconstructed, to an engagement with what must be articulated, cultivated, atld affirmed
in its wake' .124
These are, of course, criticisms of the same ilk as those that we have noted above
with regmd to ethnographic resemch and writing. Epistemological problems related to a
refusal to allow positivist or foundationalist notions of truth to dictate the success or
failure of ethnographic research fall along the same critical lines that White is interested
in addressing. Our narratives can never be so sure of themselves. There is continuous
critique with relation to the origins and figurations of narrative that prevents us from
mlliloving conviction, and this critique is shown up in part by the various reflexive
entanglements inherent in etilliographic work. The problem for ethnographers, then-and
the parallel problem that White is dealing with-is that if we me to sustain any
responsibility, care or rigor in ethnographic research and writing we must be able to find
some grounds for adjudication.
White argues that this requires a recognition that 'all fundamental
conceptualizations of selt~ other, and world me contestable'.125 He continues: 'Second,
there is the sense that such conceptualizations are neve1iheless necessary or unavoidable
P3 Wl . S .. Afji . 4




for an adequately reflective ethical and political life.' 126 (Where White says 'ethical and
political life' , I propose that without transposition we can read 'ethnographic practices'.)
The identification of a certain understanding of one's self and world that is both
'fundamental and contestable' is what White proposes to call 'weak ontology'.
Where strong ontologies resist in various ways the designation of one's thinking
about self and world as ftmdamentally contestable-weak ontologies embrace the
contingent and fragile nature of this broadly defined category of ontology. 127 Unlike
strong ontological positions, 'weak ontologies do not proceed by categorical positings of,
say, human nature or telos, accompanied by a crystalline conviction of the truth of that
positing. Rather, what they ofTer are figurations of human being in tenus of certain
existential realities, most notably language, mortality...natality and the articulation of
"sources of the self''' .128 White argues that these'existential realities' are constitutive of
human being in the world and of both the content and possibilities of the stories that we
tell, but that they cmillot be fully detenuined in a categorical manner in any given case.
Following theorists like Charles Taylor and-more closely, I think-Judith Butler and
her Foucauldian inheritance, White claims that 'gaining access to something tmiversal
126 Ibid., 8.
127 White gives a brief account of this shift in what is designated by 'ontology' on ibid., 3-6. See also
'Weak Ontology', passim.
128 White, Sustaining Affirmation, 9. The phrase 'sources ofthe self is from Charles Taylor. See Sources of
the Self: The Making ofModern Identity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989).
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about human being and world is always also a construction that cannot rid itself of a
historical dimension' .129
The most interesting aspect of White's concept of weak ontology for the purpose
of saying something about the ethical dimensions of etlmographic storytelling is the
relation between critique and contestability. This is related to White's claim that it may
be more interesting for nanative agents-ethnographers in our case-to consider whether
a weak ontological scheme bolsters a 'greater propensity ... to feel and imagine the
rudiments of cOlmectedness through an experience of common subjection rather than
through the recognition that we each possess the same power or capaci(v'. 130 When heard
in the context of ethnographic storytelling this kind of positioning of the ethnographer
requires a certain fragility and humility in storytelling. Etlmographers would be
reflexively displaced as the autonomous and unproblematic teller of stories about others'
stories, and repositioned-and tllis agrees with Jackson's claims above-as a sharer in a
common predicament, narrating accordingly if still critically.
This does not, however, mean that notions of truth and rigor in ethnographic
storytelling are displaced as well. In fact, I think that the rigor and care involved in
writing etlmographic stories in a weak ontological way requires much sharper analytical
and critical resources and practices than those stories that purport to have guaranteed
their truth unproblematically by way of an idealist or verificationist epistemology. White
puts it this way:
129 White, Sustaining Affirmation, 9. One of White's chapters treats Butler's work-especially her recent
work-as being exemplary of the weak ontological position he is proposing.
130 White, 'Weak Ontology', 25.
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Felicitous weak ontologies cannot simply declare their
contestability, fallibility, or partiality at the start and then proceed
pretty much as before ... [A weak ontology's] elaboration of
fundamental meanings must in some sense fold back upon itself,
disrupting its own smooth constitution of a unity. In a way, its
contestability will thus be enacted rather than just annollilced. 13l
Can we not already see enactments of this contestability in some of the ethnographies we
have considered? What does it do to our reading of Goldman's text, for example, when
before we reach the composite narratives she wonders whether her research might have
tmned out differently had she W011l shades of orange or red on her first visit to
Rajneeshpmam? How do we understand Brown's writing as truth-telling when she gives
fictional accounts of Alomdes' family history? I think that strategies of this sort in
ethnographic storytelling allow for the inscription within the narratives or the text of a
persistent fragility, not merely as an 'announcement' but as an 'enactment'.
Since in any case narratives about religious practices-whether self-narratives or
etlmographers' narratives-are both 'fundamental and contestable', this fragility must be
'taken care or in some way by those who are telling stories and those who hear them.
Ricoeur says that this recognition entails an 'ethics of discourse'. For him, testimony-
storytelling, narrative-necessitates trust. 'When I testify to something I am asking the
other to trust that what I am saying is true. To share a testimony is an exchange of trust.
131 White, Sustaining Ajjirmation, 8.
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Beyond this we calmot go.' 132 Ricoeur's claim echoes White's suggestion above that we
think of the intersubjective space as one of 'common subjection' rather than the
possession of equal capacity. If this is right, then etlmographic storytelling requires
responsibility, trust, humility, and the recognition of finitude. These are practices and
concerns that perhaps we are not accustomed to attaching to the accomplishments of
social-scientific research.
White argues that precisely the recognition and incorporation ofthe 'existential
realities' mentioned above open onto resources for sustaining practices oftruth-telling
alld critical rigor that do not resort to appeal to uncritical foundations-in the sense of
foundations that cannot be criticized. 133 White proposes that we understand our
'fundamental intimations of human being' as 'part of a horizontal circuit of reflection,
affect, and argumentation' .134 White is saying that what is at stake in ethical-political
discourse (for us, etlmographic storytelling) is not just a certain way of telling the truth,
but the way that we conceive of truth itself.
The circuit is a three-cornered one... One corner is formed by the
judgments and nonus relevant to specific contexts of action; these,
as I have said, receive a prefiguring influence from ontological
concepts, which in turn constitute a second corner. But... such
132 Ricoeur, 'Imagination, Testimony, and Trust', 17.




concepts are themselves not immune from pressures for revision
arising out of insights gleaned from specific action contexts. l3S
The third comer in this reciprocal circuit has to do with how each instance of ethical-
political discourse relates to the'broadest historical "we" claims and narratives' .J36 Each
of these comers acts upon the other reflectively, affectively, and critically in such a way
that each is always at play in any given case, though not in some definitive or categorical
way. Huw each is in play and yvhat that' each' is in any given instance is pa11 of what is at
stake in the 'play' itself.
We can see intimations of these circuits in theorists like McGuire a11d in Bender's
book Heaven '8 Kitchen. McGuire points out what counts as religious practices in any
given instance is a question that always ought to be at stake in ethnographic research a11d
writing. J37 The etlmographer who has already detennined what is and is not religious fails
to carefully attend to the religious scene that she is studying. But if it is the case that the
ethnographer of religion CaImot determine beforehand what is and is not religious, how
does she lmow where to look for religious phenomena? Part of what White is saying is
tllat we have to make some claim about what counts as religious practices or phenomena,
but we cannot leave that claim alone. Etlmographers of religion have to allow their claims
about what counts as religious to be intenogated and affected by the very research and
writing that they do on the basis of those claims, thereby opening circuits of reflection,
affect, and argumentation all the ·way down in etlmographic reasoning.
135 Ibid., 11.
136 Ibid., 12.
l37 See for example, McGuire, Lived Religion, 19-44.
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In conclusion, I would like to say something about why White's framework
applied to ethnographic storytelling ought to be considered ethical, since I do not think
that this claim is self-evident. It seems to me that it is at least as plausible to apply
White's weak ontological schema in a way that frames it as suggesting best practices or
methodological strategies for ethnographic work. In fact, this is one way that I think
White's framework should be considered. But my central claim here is that the
methodological is also the ethical.
We have already incorporated language into our descriptions of storytelling that
are aligned with certain concepts of ethics. But of course what we mean when we say
ethics is not always clear. I would like to offer a tentative definition of ethics and suggest
some ways of thinking about etlmographic storytelling in relation to this definition. The
definition of ethics that I would like to suggest is that the ethical isjust the way that
human beingsfind thernselves in the 1'I'orid as responsible beings. Responsibility here
should be read not as the duty or debt one has, but as the ability to respond-the
response-ability that humans have in virtue of their way of being in the world in relation
to other humans (and, probably, non-humans as well). Mmiin Buber says it this way: 'It
is not that you are to answer but that you are able.' 138 This way of thinking about ethics
as response-ability means that what is ethical is just how we are in the world.
Furthennore, as Butler argues, ethics in this sense is also just how we are formed as
ethical agents or subjects to begin with. 139 Subjectivation is the fonnation of the ethical.
138 Martin Bubel', 'Dialogue', in Between Man and Man (London: Routledge, 2002), 40.
139 See for example, Butler, Giving an Account ofOnese(f, 3-40; and Precarious Life: The Powers oj'
Mourning and Violence (London: Verso, 2004), 128-151.
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Since part of our concem through the last three chapters has been the relationship
between the subjective and the objective (and the other schema-polarities we have
considered), this situates ethics in this sense at the center of concems about etlmographic
storytelling. Rather than only suggesting that the etlmography of religion ought to be
practiced ethically, I am instead claiming that the very subjects and phenomena at stake
in etlmographic research and writing are irreducibly ethical. Etlmography is concemed
with ethics.
In briefly suggesting that ethics be thought of in this way, the potential confusion
arises between the 'ought' and 'is' of the ethical. That is, by claiming that ethics is just
how we are in the world we do not seem to leave much room for saying how we ought to
be ethically. For certainly things are not as they should be. Is not one of our motivations
for etlmographic storytelling to promote a better understanding in the service of righting
wrongs? Brown argues that in fact this ought to be a guiding criterion for ethnographic
work: 'Truth telling and justice... seem to be more fitting criteria than the canons of
scientific research. ,140
My claim here is that though we find ourselves in the world as ethical beings, this
way of being is covered or forgotten in all kinds of institutions and discourse. So pali of
the work of etlmographic storytelling is to uncover and remind us of our constitutively
response-able being in the world. Surely the promotion of justice in the world is
tmthinkable outside of the ability to aliiculate the existential and ontological conditions
under which the concem for justice emerges. Only if we think the work of etlmography as
140 Brown, 'Writing about the "Other," Revisited', 130.
telling stories that remind us of our ethical being in the world can ethnography





I began in Chapter II by tracing a genealogy of schemas about what we study
when we study society, and articulating some of those schemas in relation to each other
in order to try and get clear about what the study of society is. I offered Garfinkel's
reading of Durkheim as a felicitous way of thinking about the central problem of social
science research: 'The objective reality of social facts is sociology's fundamental
pherlOmenon. ,141 We saw in Berger and Luckmann a further articulation or refinement of
this in their claim that the basic problem of sociology is: 'How is it possible that
subjective meanings become objective facticities?' 142 After articulating some schema
polarities within which this question might be addressed in social-scientific research, I
argued that the proper work of etlmography cannot be aligned with one pole over another
but that it should be understood as variously articulating and reflecting upon the relation
between these schema-poles in specific social scenes.
In Chapter III I argued that the way that ethnographic research and writing
addresses these various schema-polarities is by telling stories about others' stories. After
considering some theories of storytelling and ways of think:ing about narrative, I argued
that storytelling is a precise and strategic way that one can address the central problems
141 Garfinkel, Ethnomethodology's Program, 66.
142 Berger and Luckmaml, The Social Construction ofReality, 18.
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of social science as articulated by Garfinkel, Berger and Luckmann in Chapter II.
Examples from three recent ethnographies of religion allowed me to aIiiculate that not
only the kinds of stories that are told but how they are told aI1d the 1-Fays that stOlytelling
is conceived have an effect on the accomplishments of ethnographic work, which are
heterogeneous. These various choices about how to go about storytelling affect the
ethnographer's access to the phenomena that are available for research. Ethnographies
stories are never 'tell-alls', and ethnographers need to reflexively attend in both their
research and writing to the contingent and unstable nature of telling stories about others'
stories.
Finally, in Chapter IV I attempted to aIiiculate some ways of thinking about
etlmographic storytelling that account for the contingent, fragile, unstable and reflexive
chaI'acter of its methods and accomplishments. Focusing on the framework that White
sketches around the concept of 'weak ontology', I argued that the care and responsibility
that are fostered by acknowledging our stories as both 'fundamental and contestable'-
and acknowledging them in the ways that White lays out-ethnographers can give
rigorous accolmts of social scenes that avoid fOlmdationalist or positivist epistemological
pitfalls. Furthem1ore, I argued that this is a fundamentally ethical way of thinking about
etlmography, and that both the work and object of ethnographic research is ethical. I
claimed that the work of ethnography should be framed as telling stories that remind us
of our ethical being in the world, that is, that reminds us that we find ourselves in the
world as beings that are constituted by our ability to respond, our response-ability.
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There appears to be a large gulf between the reformed Durkheimian definition of
the work of social-scientific research that we began with in Chapter II and the way that I
suggested we should understand the work of ethnography at the end of Chapter IV. At the
very least it can be said that the positivist Durkheim would not have thought that
sociology can have anything to do with ethics. But if society is 'immortally' maintained
by our common actions and interactions as actors who build up our social worlds by
responding to the building of others-others before us and others alongside us-and if
those actors' own understanding of the nature of that social 'building' is primarily
narrative, then the program that Durkheimlaid out for social research ought to pay
attention to the narrative aspects of the relation between the subjective and the objective
in the maintenance of social worlds. A single methodology or framework is incapable of
taking into account the multiplicities of the building, maintenance and reflexivity of
social worlds. So ethnography should not be construed as a privileged or 'betier' way of
doing social-scientific research than others. (Though some ways of doing social-scientific
research are bad, not in virtue of being less good than ethnography but in virtue of being
incapable of revealing interesting truths or lmderstanding about society.) Rather, different
methods and frameworks for social-scientific research cover up certain aspects of the
social, and this is constitutive of their ability to access celiain other aspects. I have tried
to show that etlmographers proceed by telling critical and rigorous stories about others'




This essay is both descriptive and prescriptive. It is clear from the ethnographies
with which I engage that many ethnographers pay attention to the narrative,
phenomenological and ethical complexities of ethnographic work that I am interested in
here. What is most important for etlmographers of religion is that their work be framed
properly and rigorously within these three complexes. This requires an explicit awareness
of how the sociological questions of ethnographies fit into schemas of social research like
the ones we dealt with in Chapter 1. It further requires a continually critical reflexivity
with respect to the scope of the claims that can be accounted for in light of the way that
ethnographies fit into those schemas. And finally, it requires a weak ontological
framework for the articulation, reasonableness, and veracity of etlmographic research and
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